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1Empirical Assessment of the Existence of
Taxable Agglomeration Rents
Abstract
The New Economic Geography literature claims that ￿rms are ready to pay
more tax in ￿big markets￿because of agglomeration rents. Tax authorities can
thus set higher tax rates in denser economic area, hence an opposite mechanism
to the ￿race to the bottom￿process described by the classical tax competition
theory. The aim of this paper is to empirically assess the existence of such
agglomeration rents. We use Swiss data on municipalities corporate income tax
rates and ￿rms location to test the tax gap between these municipalities and
the most peripheral one using a theory-based relation. Our estimations indicate
that municipalities with higher agglomeration rents (measured as the number
of ￿rms plus the "potential of neighboring ￿rms") are setting higher corporate
income tax rates, hence con￿rming the existence of taxable agglomeration rents.
Keywords: agglomeration rents, tax competition, potential of neighboring
￿rms
J.E.L. Classi￿cation: C4, H2, R12
21 Introduction
The debate on tax harmonization versus tax competition has been relaunched
by the new EU enlargement wave, regardless of the view of the European com-
mission that suggested in 2001 that ￿a reasonable degree of tax competition
within the EU is healthy and should be allowed to operate￿ .1 This very com-
mission were however proposing in October 1997 a package to tackle harmful
tax competition within the Union, arguing that there was a need for action at
the European level in order to prevent signi￿cant losses of tax revenue and to re-
verse the trend of an increasing tax burden on labour compared to more mobile
tax bases.2 These changing views re￿ ect the emergence of competing theories
against the up to then dominant theory of ￿race to the bottom￿that asserts
that in an international tax competition context, the mobile factor (capital)
bears too little of the tax burden to the disadvantage of the immobile factor
(labor): countries lower their tax rates on this mobile factor in their attempt to
attract more, while increasing the tax rate on the immobile factor to compen-
sate the lost of revenue induced by their ￿rst action. This point was formerly
made by Gordon (1983), Mierzkowski and Zodrow (1986) and Wilson (1986)
among others.
The competing theories are from three di⁄erent analytical frameworks: the
extension of the neoclassical framework to asymmetric countries, the computable
1European Commision (2001), ￿Future priorities for EU tax policy￿, Working document
prepared for the fourteenth meeting of the taxation Policy Group, 16 March 2001, Doc.
TPGn010316.
2Communication from the Commission to the council, ￿Towards tax co-ordination in the
European Union￿, Brussels, 01.10.1997
3general equilibrium and the new economic geography framework. The asym-
metric tax competition models developed by Bucovetsky (1991), Wilson (1991),
Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Krogstrup (2002) claims that larger countries
face a lower elasticity of capital to tax rate, and therefore choose a higher
tax rate than smaller country. The computable general equilibrium framework
describes more complex economies with inter-related economic agents playing
rationally. The model is then calibrated on the social accounting matrix of the
economy under consideration and di⁄erent tax policies impacts are simulated
(e.g. S￿rensen, 2002, and Mendoza and Tesar, 2003). Ottaviano and Ypersele
(2002) build a general equilibrium model integrating international externalities,
asymmetric sizes, imperfect competition and trade costs providing a full-￿ edged
global welfare analysis of tax competition.
The new economic geography framework is the most ￿ ourishing. The basic
idea is the existence of agglomeration rents that can be taxed. Ludema and
Wooton (1998) show that when trade costs decrease, integration appears to
attenuate tax competition. Andersson and Forslid (1999) show that mobile
factors may not respond to marginal changes in tax rates if they are locked
in by the existence of industrial clusters, hence location economies producing
taxable rents. Kind and al. (2000) build a full-￿ edged model where capital goods
and ￿rms are mobile, leading to an outcome of tax competition depending on
trade costs and pecuniary externalities.
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) formally derive an equation linking tax di⁄er-
ential and agglomeration rents in a Core-Periphery model, indicating that the
4stronger agglomeration rents, the wider tax di⁄erential between the Core and
the Periphery. This implies a bell-shaped tax di⁄erential since agglomeration
rent is shown to be a bell-shaped function of trade costs. Borck and P￿ ueger
(2006) ￿nd the same result using a model yielding partial agglomeration equilib-
ria in addition to the Core-Periphery equilibrium, hence generalizing this result.
The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical assessment of this theory-
based result. We focus on Switzerland since we have a database of municipali-
ties corporate income tax rates constructed and used by Br￿lhart and Jametti
(2006). In addition, the unique tax system in Switzerland makes it a labora-
tory for testing various tax competition issues. Indeed, the Swiss tax system
is in￿ uenced by the federal structure of the country which consists of three
tiers of government: a federation of 26 cantons, each of them constituted by
relatively autonomous municipalities. For instance, the federal corporate in-
come tax is a ￿ at tax rate of 8.5%, and each canton has its own tax law that
sets the framework under which the municipalities belonging to the canton set
their own tax rates.3 Several studies have addressed some speci￿c tax compe-
tition issues in Switzerland. Kirchgaessner and Pommerehne (1996) and Feld
and Kirchgaessner (2001) ￿nd that residence and individuals location decisions
are determined by the level of personal income taxes and transfer payment on
residence, suggesting a tax competition among cantons and cities to attract
wealthier resident. Br￿lhart and Jametti (2006) study taxation externalities in
federations of benevolent governments using a database on local taxes (personal,
3Information extracted from http://www.switzerland-4you.com/tax_system.htm
5wealth, corporate capital tax rates) in a sample of Swiss municipalities that fea-
ture direct-democratic ￿scal decision making and ￿nd that vertical externalities
between di⁄erent levels of government leads to sub-optimally high tax rates.
However, none of these studies use this genuine tax system to assess the
new economic geography result of the existence of taxable agglomeration rents.
This paper ￿lls in this gap by using the available data on municipalities corpo-
rate income tax rates, ￿rms location and municipalities geographical location
to test this theory-based result of taxable agglomeration rents. Our estima-
tions indicate that municipalities with higher agglomeration rents (measured
as the number of ￿rms plus the "potential of neighboring ￿rms") are setting
higher corporate income tax rates, hence con￿rming the existence of taxable
agglomeration rents.4
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the theoretical
model linking tax di⁄erential to agglomeration rents. Section 3 explores the
relevant econometric issues raised by the model and the estimation results are
presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Borck and P￿ ueger (2006) provide the up-
to-date theoretical base to analyze tax competition under the existence of ag-
glomeration rents. The ￿rst paper is based on the Core-Periphery framework,
4What we mean by "potential of neighboring ￿rms" is thoroughly described in Section 3.
6while the second uses a model yielding partial stable agglomeration in addition
to the Core-Periphery outcome. Both studies come to the conclusion that tax
di⁄erential between alternative locations is explained by the di⁄erence in their
agglomeration pattern. In this section, we summarize the model developed by
Baldwin and Krugman (2004), which can be easily reformulated in a testable
empirical relation.
Let consider a federation of two countries having identical preferences and
technologies but setting independently their tax rates. We assume that the level
of trade costs induces a Core-Periphery structure, that is one country is the Core
and the other is the Periphery, as in Baldwin and Krugman (2004). There are
two sectors( Agriculture (A) and Manufacture (M)) and two production factors
(Entrepreneurs (K) and Workers (L)). Entrepreneurs are mobile while workers
are immobile. The agricultural sector produces an homogeneous good using
only workers according to constant returns to scale technology under perfect
competition: the competitive wage is w and the unit input coe¢ cient is aA.
The manufacture sector is monopolistically competitive and faces increasing
returns to scale. Trade is costless in the homogeneous sector, while we assume
an iceberg transport cost ￿ in the monopolistic sector.
2.1 Consumers side
















where CM is a CES composite of all varieties of the manufactured good and
CA is the consumption of the agricultural good A, n and n￿ are the number of
varieties produced respectively in the Core and the Periphery, ￿ is the expendi-
ture share on the manufactured good M and ￿ (￿>1) is the constant elasticity
of substitution between varieties.
The Cobb-Douglas preference implies that the optimal level of consumption
of a good is proportional to the budget share addressed to this good, and the













where pj is the price of a typical variety j, pA is the price of the homogenous
good and E is the consumption expenditure in the Core country.
2.2 Producers side
On the supply side, it is assumed that the production of a typical variety of a
manufactured good involves the services of one entrepreneur, representing the
￿xed cost, and aM units of labor for each unit of output produced. The total
cost of producing x units of a variety is thus ￿ + waMx, where ￿ is the reward
to entrepreneurs. Free trade in the A good equalizes prices across countries and
8thus equalizes the wage rate of workers in both countries: pA = w = w￿ = 1.5
In the monopolistic sector, ￿rms charge prices equal to ￿aM=(￿ ￿ 1) in their
local market and to ￿￿aM=(￿ ￿ 1) in their export market. If we make the
normalization aM = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿, their pro￿ts are just 1=￿ times their sales.
Using equation (2) the prices yields the following pro￿t function for the Core





















where EW is the level of world expenditure, sE is the Core country share of
EW, n (respectively n￿) is the number of active ￿rms in the Core (respectively
Periphery) country and ￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿ measures trade ￿freeness￿ : ￿ = 0 corresponds
to autarky and ￿ = 1 corresponds to free trade.
2.3 Tax authorities side
The third side of this model is the tax game by tax authorities. We focus
on a reduced-form of the governments of the Core and the Periphery welfare:
G = G(n;t) and G￿ = G￿ (n￿;t￿) where t and t￿ are the tax rates set by the
respective tax authorities. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) assume a three-stage
game: in the ￿rst stage, the Core country sets its tax rate t, then the Periphery
5It is assumed that both countries produces some A good.
9country sets its tax rate t￿ and ￿nally migration and production occurs in the




where P = (n + ￿n￿)
￿=(￿￿1) and P￿ = (￿n + n￿)
￿=(￿￿1)
are price indices.
Entrepreneurs move to the country which a⁄ords them the highest post-tax
real reward and governments set tax rates that permit them to keep their in-
dustrial sector. Since the Core country government is the ￿rst mover in the
tax game, it will set a limit tax that hinders the Periphery country to be more
attractive to ￿rms. In such a situation, the Periphery country set its uncon-
strained tax rate, t￿
u, which is the tax rate maximizing its welfare G￿conditional
on being the periphery. The location condition of the Core-Periphery outcome
is thus:




where t is the limit tax set in the core, t￿nd is the non-delocation tax rate
which makes ￿rms located in the Core country just indi⁄erent about moving
to the Periphery country and ￿ is agglomeration rents in the Core country.
The equilibrium tax rate in the Core country (t) appears to be linked to the
Periphery￿ s non-delocation tax rate (t￿nd) rather than the unconstrained tax
rate (t￿
u) set by the Periphery tax authority. Baldwin and al. (2003) propose
an approximation of the tax rate gap between the Core and the Periphery (t ￿
10t￿
u) using a log-linear approximation of (t ￿ t￿nd) and an approximation of the
periphery welfare function around the non-delocation tax rate:
￿t = t ￿ t￿









This relation indicates that the equilibrium tax rate in the Core country is
the unconstrained tax rate of the Periphery country plus the agglomeration rents
minus the relative variation of the Periphery country￿ s welfare due to changes
in n￿ and t￿
u. By approximating the welfare function of the Periphery country
G￿ by a quadratic function of its number of ￿rms n￿ and its tax rate t￿
u, we can
derive the following marginal welfare functions:
@G￿




= ￿ + 2￿t￿
u (7)
and use them to compute the relative term in equation (9). Finally, the tax rate
gap between the Core and the Periphery can be rewritten as:





In order to have a linear formulation, we compute the second order polyno-
mial expansion of equation (8), which yields:












2 ￿ 1: (9)
To empirically assess this relation, we need to reformulate it in a multi-
11region framework and propose some relevant proxy to measure agglomeration
rents and tax rates. The following section deals with these points.
3 Econometric issues
Firstly, let us deal with the measure of tax rates to be used in the empirical
exercise. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) focus on capital and labor tax rates
that are assumed identical. This is not true in real world, in any case not in
Switzerland as can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1: Tax rates in Swiss municipalities in 1995
Tax rates (in %)
Average Standard Coe¢ cient
Tax bases Errors of Variation
Private capital stock 0.22 0.11 1.90
Single workers￿income 4.20 1.09 3.86
Married workers￿income 3.59 1.14 3.16
Low pro￿tability ￿rms￿income 3.62 1.64 2.21
Medium pro￿tability ￿rms￿income 5.15 1.93 2.67
High pro￿tability ￿rms￿income 7.43 2.88 2.58
Source: Br￿lhart and Jametti (2006) database and author￿ s own calculations.
The Swiss data indicate a lower variability of capital tax rates compared
to labor and corporate income tax rates. Deriving a tax di⁄erential equation
12assuming that capital and labor tax rates are di⁄erent is beyond the scope of
this paper in which we aim to the evaluate empirically equation (9). Br￿lhart
and Jametti (2006) provide a nice evaluation of Swiss municipalities corporate
income taxes, which are based on ￿rms pro￿tability measured as the ratio be-
tween ￿rms pro￿ts and their capital stock. They collected corporate tax rates
for median-capital ￿rms with low (2%), medium (9%) and high (32%) pro￿tabil-
ity over 210 municipalities covering 24 of the 26 Swiss cantons. Since corporate
income tax impacts on the whole ￿rm and not on production factors like capital
and labor tax rates, we will assume that ￿t in equation (9) rather represents
the di⁄erential in corporate income tax rates between the Core and the Periph-
ery. To check the sensitivity of our results with regard to this typology, we also
consider the average of these three tax rates in the empirical estimation.
Secondly, the Core-Periphery framework used in Baldwin and Krugman
(2004) is clearly unrealistic since any location with relatively signi￿cant pop-
ulation (cities or towns) appear to attract some manufacturing ￿rms. However,
as demonstrated by Borck and P￿ ueger (2006), the tax competition outcome
derived in Baldwin and Krugman (2004) can be generalized to the case of partial
stable agglomeration: higher tax rates are set in locations with larger manufac-
turing sectors. In this partial agglomeration framework, we can set a threshold
number of ￿rms to partition the locations between partial Cores (receiving more
than the threshold number of ￿rms) and partial Peripheries (receiving less than
the threshold).
13Our ￿rst attempt to do such partition was to consider the clusters of mu-
nicipalities de￿ned as ￿agglomerations￿by the Swiss Federal O¢ ce of Statistics
as the Core locations and the other municipalities as the peripheral ones. The
￿agglomerations￿are bigger municipalities formed by a central municipality and
many contiguous municipalities forming a unique economic center. However, the
tax di⁄erential between these ￿agglomerations￿and the other municipalities ap-
peared to be not that clear-cut as can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Tax di⁄erential between "agglomerations" and other municipalities in
Switzerland
14Figure 1 shows that corporate income tax rates are not unambiguously higher
in the ￿agglomerations￿ . Indeed, except for higher pro￿tability ￿rms￿ , the max-
imum tax rates are rather set in the non-￿agglomerations￿municipalities.
We therefore decided to use the municipality with the lowest corporate in-
come tax rate as the Periphery and the others as the alternative locations pro-
viding higher agglomeration rents. This suggests that in equation (9), all the
terms including t￿
u will be constant, which writes now as:
￿tij = a:￿ij + b + "ij (10)
where ￿tij is the corporate income tax rate di⁄erential between any of the 209
Swiss municipalities (index i) and the municipality with the lowest tax rate
(index j), ￿ij is the agglomeration rents di⁄erential between any of the 209
Swiss municipalities (index i) and the municipality with the lowest tax rate
(index j), b is a constant term and "ij is the error term.
We then have to propose an empirical evaluation of agglomeration rents.
Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Ciccone (2002) have used di⁄erent measures of
density to assess the impact of agglomeration on ￿rms￿productivity. However,
by using density measures as proxies for agglomeration in our framework, we
implicitly require all agglomeration forces to work through the number of ￿rms
or workers per hectare, without capturing any backward and forward linkages
spanning over neighbor locations. We thus need an alternative agglomeration
measure taking into account this aspect.
15The simplest and straightforward measure of agglomeration is the number
of ￿rms in a speci￿c location. Indeed, the higher the number of ￿rms in a given
location, the higher the agglomeration rents should be there, otherwise at least
some of them would have relocated in the alternative most attractive location.
In a multi-region framework, the accessibility of a location is an additional source
of attractiveness that should be included in the measure of agglomeration rents.



















where the index k represents all the 210 Swiss municipalities, nk is the number of
￿rms located in municipality k, and Distik is the distance between municipalities
i and k. Distik is computed using the Cartesian coordinates (x;y;z) of the




2 + (yi ￿ yk)
2 + (zi ￿ zk)
2: (12)
Since Switzerland is a quite small country, this is a reasonable approximation
of the great-circle distance that should be considered because of spheric form of
the Earth.
Then, we have to include a set of relevant control variables that a⁄ects tax
rates in our framework, otherwise, the estimated coe¢ cient will be misleading
because of omitted variables problem. Because of the tax system in Switzerland
16where each canton de￿nes its tax base and tax rates in the cantonal tax laws
that have to be used by their municipalities to set their own tax rates, the
natural set of control variables is a set of dummy variables specifying each of
the 24 cantons covered by the data available. We end up with the following
equation to be estimated :
￿tij = a:￿ij + b +
24 X
m=1
cm:Cantonm + "ij: (13)
The last econometric issue is the endogeneity of agglomeration in a frame-
work departing from the pure Core-Periphery structure. Indeed, in a partial
agglomeration equilibrium structure, tax rates depends on agglomeration, but
agglomeration also depends on tax rates. Our agglomeration rents proxy ￿ij
is therefore endogenous and OLS is no longer the adequate estimation method
of equation (13). If we are able to ￿nd a set of instruments variables that are
clearly related to the number of ￿rms but clearly not related to the corporate
income tax rates, we can use the Instrumental Variable estimation technique
to overcome this problem. We propose two instruments that seem to be good
candidates. In the empirical estimation section, we perform some diagnostic
tests to validate the choice of these instruments.
The ￿rst instrument is the population of the municipalities (Pi). In the new
economic geography literature, ￿rms￿location decision is clearly linked to the
presence of a potential demand (forward linkages). The population of the munic-
ipalities is a good proxy for the local market potential. In addition, this variable
is clearly not related to the corporate income tax rates set by the municipali-
17ties. Indeed, there is no reason that a dormitory municipality for instance set a
higher corporate income tax because of the local population dwelling there since
this will increase the incentive of the few ￿rms still located there to relocate in
the economic center where the dormitory municipality inhabitants go to work.
The second instrument is the extension of the ￿rst to a multi-region context.
When other potential consumers are located close to a big municipality (big
in terms of population), this increases the incentive of ￿rms to locate there.








where Ppopi is the potential of neighboring population of municipality i, Pk
is the population of municipality k, and Distik is the distance between mu-
nicipality i and k. We can then di⁄erentiate Pi and Ppopi with the values in
the peripheral municipality. We ￿nally use a two-stage least square method to
estimate the relation between tax and agglomeration as follows:
￿ij = ￿1:￿Pij + ￿2:￿Ppopij + ￿3 + ￿ij (15)
￿tij = a:￿ij + b +
24 X
m=1
cm:Cantonm + "ij: (16)
We have now a testable relation: a positive and signi￿cant value of coe¢ cient
a will con￿rm the existence of taxable agglomeration rents.
184 Empirical estimation
We use data on Swiss municipalities corporate income tax rates and ￿rms￿loca-
tion to empirically test the existence of taxable agglomeration rents. We have
in fact three di⁄erent databases: one containing information on municipalities
tax rates, one containing information of ￿rms and last containing the Carte-
sian coordinates of Swiss municipalities. We ￿rst match these databases using
the municipalities codes before computing the proxies described in the previous
section.
4.1 Description of the data
The ￿rst database we use is the Swiss municipalities tax database built by
Br￿lhart and Jametti (2006) containing among others corporate income tax
rates and some geographical variables such as the municipalities￿population on
210 Swiss municipalities for various years.
The second database we use is the Federal Statistics O¢ ce database on
Swiss ￿rms containing non-public ￿rms, their employment and the municipal-
ities where these ￿rms are located for various years. Since the coding system
of municipalities used by these two databases are exactly identical only for the
year 1995, we restrict on this year for the sake of consistency.
The third database we use is the Federal Statistics O¢ ce database on mu-
nicipalities Cartesian coordinates. For each municipality, the central coordinate
(x;y) is manually determined on a map using the most important church of
this municipality as the reference point. These coordinates are then used in a
19topographical model to evaluate the altitude z. We thus have for each Swiss
municipality these Cartesian coordinates (x;y;z) called the "Kirchspitz" coor-
dinates (referring to "church coordinates").
We match these three databases using the coding system of Swiss municipal-
ities and end up with a unique database containing tax, ￿rms, population and
geographical information. We can then compute the distance, agglomeration
rents, and potential of neighboring population proxies de￿ned in the previous
section.
4.2 Estimation results
Since our database includes three types of corporate income tax rates depending
on the pro￿tability of the ￿rms, the peripheral municipality will not necessarily
be the same depending on the tax measure used as can be seen in Table 2:
Table 2: Municipalities with lowest tax rates
Low pro￿tability Medium pro￿tability High pro￿tability Average
Municipality Freienbach Chene-Bougeries Gelterkinden Chene-Bougeries
Canton Schwitz Geneva Basel Land Geneva
Tax rate 1,15% 1,80% 2,76% 2,30%
Sources: Br￿lhart and Jametti (2006) and author own calculations.
The average corporate income tax rates are simply the arithmetic mean of
the tax rates and are included to check the robustness of the results with regard
to the typology of tax rates used proposed by Br￿lhart and Jametti (2006).
20Before running the model, let us glance at the correlation matrix of the key
variables used in the model.
Table 3: Correlation matrix
￿Pij ￿Ppopij ￿ij ￿tij
￿Pij 1.00
￿Ppopij -0.05 1.00
￿ij 0.99 -0.05 1.00
￿tij 0.04 -0.05 0.05 1.00
Table 3 uses the average tax rates as the corporate tax measures, though
the results are hardly di⁄erent when using the other tax measures. It shows
that the municipality population and its measure of agglomeration rents are
perfectly correlated which is an illustration of the backward and forward linkages
described in the new economic geography literature. The negative correlation
between municipalities￿population and their potential of neighboring population
depicts these two locations as alternative locations competing to attract ￿nal
consumers.
4.2.1 Preliminary tests
In the econometric issues, we have clearly made the point that the agglomera-
tion rents measure is rather endogenous and we proposed to use Instrumental
Variables estimation. However, we still need to empirically corroborate the
fact that the agglomeration rents proxy proposed is endogenous. This is easily
21done with the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test described in Davidson and
Mackinnon (1993):
i) Estimate the following equation, which is an extension of equation (15) to
the control variables included in equation (16):
￿ij = ￿1:￿Pij + ￿2:￿Ppopij + ￿3 +
24 X
m=1
cm:Cantonm + ￿ij: (17)
ii) Extract the residuals of this regression and include them as a regressor
in equation (16):
￿tij = a:￿ij + ￿:residuals + b +
24 X
m=1
cm:Cantonm + "ij: (18)
iii) Test for the statistical signi￿cance of ￿. If it is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero, this con￿rms the endogeneity of ￿ij.
Table 4 presents the results of this test.
Table 4: Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test
1 2 3 4
￿ -0.0001091 -0.000225 -0.0003669 -0.000367
t-stat -1.40 -1.86 -1.98 -1.89
In Table 4, Speci￿cation 1 uses the corporate income tax rates of low prof-
itability ￿rms as the dependent variable, Speci￿cation 2 uses the tax rates of
medium pro￿tability ￿rms, Speci￿cation 3 uses the tax rates of high pro￿tability
￿rms, and Speci￿cation 4 uses the average tax rates. In all the Speci￿cations
22￿ appears to be statistically signi￿cant at 85%, con￿rming the endogeneity of
￿ij.
The next step is to test for the validity of the instruments we chose to correct
for this endogeneity problem. To test for this, we resort to the Stock and Staiger
(1997) approach: regress the instrumented variable on all the instruments and
consider the F statistics; if this statistics is greater than 10, we conclude to the
validity of the instruments used. Table 5 presents these results.
Table 5: First stage regression results
Dependent variable: ￿ij
1 2 3 4
￿Pij 0.053a 0.053a 0.053a 0.053a
￿Ppopij -0.065 -0.084 -0.059 -0.084
Const -160.287a 167.648a -83.180a 167.648a
R2 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.975
F-stat 481.99 479.91 482.20 479.91
N 209 209 209 209
a means signi￿cant at 99%.
￿Ppopij does not yield statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients but the F-statistics
of the regressions are greater than 10, hence the ￿rst-stage regression appears
to be relevant. We can now focus on the second-stage regression results.
234.2.2 Analysis of the results
Table 6 presents the results of the two-stage least square estimation. The dif-
ferent speci￿cations use di⁄erent proxies as dependent variables (the corporate
income tax rates) and thus assumes di⁄erent Periphery municipalities as de-
scribed in Table 2: in Speci￿cation 1 4tij is the corporate income tax rates of
low pro￿tability ￿rms and the Periphery municipality is Freienbach in Schwitz
canton, in Speci￿cation 2 4tij is the corporate income tax rates of medium
pro￿tability ￿rms and the Periphery municipality is Chene-Bougeries in Geneva
canton, in Speci￿cation 3 4tij is the corporate income tax rates of high prof-
itability ￿rms and the Periphery municipality is Gelterkinden in Basel Land
canton, and in Speci￿cation 4 4tij is the average of these three corporate in-
come tax rates and the Periphery municipality is Chene-Bougeries in Geneva
canton.
In Table 6, a coe¢ cient with an upper index a is signi￿cant at 99%, a co-
e¢ cient with an upper index b is signi￿cant at 95%, and a coe¢ cient with an
upper index c is signi￿cant at 90%. The codes used to represent each of the
Swiss cantons dummy variable are described in the Appendix.
24Table 6: 2-SLS estimation results
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Dependent variable: 4tij
1 2 3 4
￿ij 0.0000193a 0.0000348a 0.0000582a 0.0000369a
AR 3.462a 4.653a 3.657a 3.924a
BE 1.531a 1.950a 2.505a 1.995a
BL 0.222a 0.854a -0.473a 0.186a
FR 0.210c 1.457a 4.160a 1.943a
GE -0.492a -0.618a 0.460a -0.185b
GL 1.896a 4.066a 6.090a 4.017a
GR 1.343a 1.354a 2.479a 1.726a
JU 4.155a 5.530a 4.512a 4.733a
LU 3.365a 4.092a 3.000a 3.486a
NE 1.418a 2.237a 8.190a 3.949a
NW 5.198a 5.487a 4.206a 4.964a
OW 5.615a 6.174a 5.041a 5.610a
SG 4.341a 5.391a 5.234a 4.989a
SH 1.891a 2.043a 1.146a 1.694a
SO 0.695a 3.549a 4.978a 3.074a
6We correct for any heteroshedasticity problem by using a robust standard error
speci￿cation under STATA.
25SZ -0.777a 3.750a 6.365a 3.098a
TG 1.818a 2.914a 2.793a 2.509a
TI 3.977a 5.541a 4.581a 4.700a
UR 2.671a 4.149a 2.816a 3.212a
VD 0.367a 1.306a 4.372a 2.015a
VS 0.204a 3.541a 5.510a 3.085a
ZG 0.269a 0.267a 1.351a 0.630a
ZH 1.305a 3.420a 6.480a 3.735a
Const 1.042a 0.974a 1.129a 0.648a
R2 0.977 0.954 0.939 0.943
Proba 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 209 209 209 209
a means signi￿cant at 99%. b means signi￿cant at 95%. c means signi￿cant at 90%.
The P-values indicate an overall signi￿cance of all the four speci￿cations,
and all the estimated coe¢ cients are at least signi￿cant at 90%. Interestingly,
the estimated coe¢ cient of the agglomeration rents proxy is positive and sig-
ni￿cant at 99% in all the four speci￿cations, indicating that an increase of the
agglomeration rents in a municipality induces a higher corporate income tax
rate set by its tax authority. For instance, the estimated coe¢ cient in Speci￿-
cation 4 suggests that an increase in the agglomeration rents corresponding to
1,000 more ￿rms (regardless of their level of pro￿tability) induces a corporate
income tax increase of 0.0369% on average.
26This ￿nding is in line with the prediction of the new economic geography
result of the existence of taxable agglomeration rents. Municipalities with a
larger corporate income tax base and with a larger "potential of neighboring
￿rms" appear to be aware of the fact that the attractiveness of their location
lock-in ￿rms as long as their tax rate is not set beyond a level that can dam-
age ￿rms￿pro￿tability. And we know that this limit is not reached since the
nationwide competition of Swiss municipalities and cantons necessarily leads to
the equilibrium of ￿rms￿location observed in the database we use. The estima-
tion results indicate that if a municipality receives more ￿rms, it can slightly
increase it corporate income tax rate proportionally to this in￿ ow of ￿rms with-
out inducing a massive relocation of the ￿rms operating there. This additional
revenue collected by the municipality is necessary to maintain the level of public
service and infrastructure, and consequently maintain the attractiveness of the
municipality.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to empirically evaluate the existence of taxable ag-
glomeration rents by using a theory-based econometric relation. We focused
on Swiss data on ￿rms location and tax rates set at the municipality level to
estimate the econometric relation derived from the new economic geography
literature. Swiss municipalities appear to con￿rm the existence of taxable ag-
glomeration rents, since the estimated coe¢ cient for the agglomeration rents
27proxy variable are statistically signi￿cant and positive, indicating that munici-
palities with higher agglomeration rents are setting higher corporate income tax
rates.
The new economic geography framework is plausible, and many theoretical
papers con￿rm the existence of taxable agglomeration rents. This paper is an
empirical contribution shedding light on this theory-based result. The proxy
used for agglomeration rents is straightforward (number of ￿rms) and takes into
account the proximity of competing location ("potential of neighboring ￿rms").
The results are robust to di⁄erent speci￿cations using di⁄erent corporate income
tax rates and thus di⁄erent peripheral municipalities (de￿ned as the municipality
with lowest tax rates). However the paper only focuses on Swiss municipalities,
leaving room for further empirical explorations.
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31Appendix: Decoding Swiss cantons￿codes
Code Name Size (km2)
AR Appenzel RE 243
BE Bern 5959










SG Sankt Gallen 2026
SH Scha⁄hausen 299
SO Solothurn 791
SZ Schwyz 908
TG Thurgau 991
TI Ticino 2812
UR Uri 1077
VD Vaud 3212
VS Valais 5225
ZG Zug 239
ZH Zurich 1729
Sources: http://www.about.ch/cantons/
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